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Abstract
In this paper, we develop improved techniques
for defending against adversarial examples at
scale. First, we implement the state of the art
version of adversarial training at unprecedented
scale on ImageNet and investigate whether it
remains effective in this setting—an important
open scientific question (Athalye et al., 2018).
Next, we introduce enhanced defenses using a
technique we call logit pairing, a method that en-
courages logits for pairs of examples to be sim-
ilar. When applied to clean examples and their
adversarial counterparts, logit pairing improves
accuracy on adversarial examples over vanilla ad-
versarial training; we also find that logit pairing
on clean examples only is competitive with ad-
versarial training in terms of accuracy on two
datasets. Finally, we show that adversarial logit
pairing achieves the state of the art defense on
Imagenet against PGD white box attacks, with
an accuracy improvement from 1.5% to 27.9%.
Adversarial logit pairing also successfully dam-
ages the current state of the art defense against
black box attacks on Imagenet (Trame`r et al.,
2018), dropping its accuracy from 66.6% to
47.1%. With this new accuracy drop, adversar-
ial logit pairing ties with Trame`r et al. (2018) for
the state of the art on black box attacks on Ima-
geNet.
1. Introduction
Many deep learning models today are vulnerable to adver-
sarial examples, or inputs that have been intentionally op-
timized to cause misclassification. In the context of com-
puter vision, object recognition classifiers incorrectly rec-
ognize images that have been modified with small, often
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imperceptible perturbations. It is important to developmod-
els that are robust to adversarial perturbations for a variety
of reasons:
• so that machine learning can be used in situations
where an attacker may attempt to interfere with the
operation of the deployed system,
• so that machine learning is more useful for model-
based optimization,
• to gain a better understanding of how to provide per-
formance guarantees for models under distribution
shift,
• to gain a better understanding of how to enforce
smoothness assumptions, etc.
In this paper, we investigate defenses against such adversar-
ial attacks. The contributions of this paper are the follow-
ing:
• We implement the state of the art version of adversar-
ial training at unprecedented scale and investigate its
effectiveness on the ImageNet dataset.
• We propose logit pairing, a method that encourages
the logits for two pairs of examples to be similar. We
propose two flavors of logit pairing: clean and adver-
sarial.
• We show that clean logit pairing is a method with
minimal computational cost that defends against PGD
black box attacks almost as well as adversarial train-
ing for two datasets.
• We show that adversarial logit pairing is a method
that leads to higher accuracy when subjected to white
box and black box attacks. We achieve the current
state of the art on black-box and white-box accuracies
with our model trained with adversarial logit pairing.
• We show that attacks constructed with our adversari-
ally trained models substantially damage the current
state of the art for black box defenses on ImageNet
(Trame`r et al., 2018). We then show that our models
are resistant to these attacks.
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2. Definitions and threat models
Defensemechanisms are intended to provide security under
particular threat models. The threat model specifies the ca-
pabilities of the adversary. In this paper, we always assume
the adversary is capable of forming attacks that consist of
perturbations of limited L∞ norm. This is a simplified task
chosen because it is more amenable to benchmark evalua-
tions. Realistic attackers against computer vision systems
would likely use different attacks that are difficult to charac-
terize with norm balls, such as Brown et al. (2017). We con-
sider two different threat models characterizing amounts of
information the adversary can have:
1. White box: the attacker has full information about the
model (i.e. knows the architecture, parameters, etc.).
2. Black box: the attacker has no information about the
model’s architecture or parameters, and no ability to
send queries to the model to gather more information.
3. The challenges of defending ImageNet
classifiers
Multiple methods to defend against adversarial ex-
amples have been proposed (Buckman et al., 2018;
Goodfellow et al., 2014; Kolter & Wong, 2017;
Madry et al., 2017; Papernot et al., 2016; Szegedy et al.,
2013; Trame`r et al., 2018; Xu et al., 2017). Recently,
Athalye et al. (2018) broke several defenses proposed for
the white box setting that relied on empirical testing to
establish their level of robustness. In our work we choose
to focus on Madry et al. (2017) because it is a method
that has withstood intense scrutiny even in the white box
setting. Athalye et al. (2018) endorsed Madry et al. (2017)
as the only such method that they were not able to break.
However, they observe that the defense from Madry et al.
(2017) has not been shown to scale to ImageNet. There
are also certified defenses (Aditi Raghunathan, 2018;
Aman Sinha, 2018; Kolter & Wong, 2017) that provide
guaranteed robustness, but the total amount of robustness
they guarantee is small compared to the amount empirically
claimed by Madry et al. (2017). This leaves Madry et al.
(2017) as a compelling defense to study because it provides
a large benefit that has withstood intensive scrutiny.
In this paper, we implement theMadry et al. (2017) defense
at ImageNet scale for the first time and evaluate it using
the same attack methodology as has been used at smaller
scale. Our results provide an important conclusive answer
to an open question (Athalye et al., 2018) about whether
this defense strategy scales.
The defense used by Madry et al. (2017) consists
of using adversarial training (Goodfellow et al., 2014;
Szegedy et al., 2013) with an attack called “projected gradi-
ent descent” (PGD). Their PGD attack consists of initializ-
ing the search for an adversarial example at a random point
within the allowed norm ball, then running several itera-
tions of the basic iterative method (Kurakin et al., 2017b) to
find an adversarial example. The noisy initial point creates
a stronger attack than other previous iterative methods such
as BIM (Kurakin et al., 2017a), and performing adversarial
training with this stronger attack makes their defense more
successful (Madry et al., 2017). Kurakin et al. (2017a) ear-
lier reported that adversarial training with (non-noisy) BIM
adversarial examples did not result in general robustness to
a wide variety of attacks.
All previous attempted defenses on ImageNet
(Kurakin et al., 2017a; Trame`r et al., 2018) report er-
ror rates of 99 percent on strong, multi-step white box
attacks. We, for the first time, scale the Madry et al.
(2017) defense to this setting and successfully apply it.
Furthermore, we also introduce an enhanced defense that
greatly improves over this baseline and improves the
amount of robustness achieved.
4. Methods
4.1. Adversarial training
Madry et al. (2017) suggests that PGD is a universal first
order adversary – in other words, developing robustness
against PGD attacks also implies resistance against many
other first order attacks. We use adversarial training with
PGD as the underlying basis for our methods:
argmin
θ
E(x,y)∈pˆdata
(
max
δ∈S
L(θ, x+ δ, y)
)
(1)
where pˆdata is the underlying training data distribution,
L(θ, x, y) is a loss function at data point x which has true
class y for a model with parameters θ, and the maximiza-
tion with respect to δ is approximated using noisy BIM.
We find that we achieve better performance not by liter-
ally solving the min-max problem described byMadry et al.
(2017). Instead, we train on a mixture of clean and ad-
versarial examples, as recommended by Goodfellow et al.
(2014); Kurakin et al. (2017a):
argmin
θ
[
E(x,y)∈pˆdata
(
max
δ∈S
L(θ, x+ δ, y)
)
+
E(x,y)∈pˆdata
(
L(θ, x, y)
)]
(2)
This formulation helps to maintain good accuracy on
clean examples. We call this defense formulation mixed-
minibatch PGD (M-PGD). We note that though we have
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varied the defense slightly from the one used in Madry et al.
(2017), we still use the attack from Madry et al. (2017),
which is also endorsed by Athalye et al. (2018).
4.2. Logit pairing
We propose logit pairing, a method to encourage the logits
from two images to be similar to each other. For a model
that takes inputs x and computes a vector of logits z =
f(x), logit pairing adds a loss
λL (f(x), f(x′))
for pairs of training examples x and x′, where λ is a coef-
ficient determining the strength of the logit pairing penalty
and L is a loss function encouraging the logits to be similar.
In this paper we use L2 loss for L, but other losses such as
L1 or Huber could also be suitable choices.
We explored two logit pairing techniques which are de-
scribed below. We found each of them to be useful: ad-
versarial logit pairing obtains the best-yet defense against
the Madry attack, while clean logit pairing, and a related
idea we call logit squeezing, provide competitive defenses
at significantly reduced cost.
4.2.1. ADVERSARIAL LOGIT PAIRING
Adversarial logit pairing (ALP) matches the logits from a
clean image x and its corresponding adversarial image x′.
In traditional adversarial training, the model is trained to
assign both x and x′ to the same output class label, but the
model does not receive any information indicating thatx′ is
more similar to x than to another example of the same class.
ALP provides an extra regularization term encouraging sim-
ilar embeddings of the clean and adversarial versions of the
same example, helping guide the model towards better in-
ternal representations of the data.
Consider a model with parameters θ trained on a minibatch
M of clean examples {x(1), . . . ,x(m)} and corresponding
adversarial examples {x˜(1), . . . , x˜(m)}. Let f(x; θ) be the
function mapping from inputs to logits of the model. Let
J(M, θ) be the cost function used for adversarial training
(the cross-entropy loss applied to train the classifier on each
example in the minibatch, plus any weight decay, etc.). Ad-
versarial logit pairing consists of minimizing the loss
J(M, θ) + λ
1
m
m∑
i=1
L
(
f(x(i); θ), f(x˜(i); θ)
)
.
4.2.2. CLEAN LOGIT PAIRING
In clean logit pairing (CLP), x and x′ are two randomly
selected clean training examples, and thus are typically not
even from the same class. Let J (clean)(M, θ) be the loss
function used to train a classifier on a minibatch M, such
as a cross-entropy loss and any other loss terms such as
weight decay. Clean logit pairing consists of minimizing
the loss
J (clean)(M, θ) + λ
2
m
m
2∑
i=1
L
(
f(x(i); θ), f(x(i+
m
2
); θ)
)
.
We included experiments with clean logit pairing in order
to perform an ablation study, understanding the contribu-
tion of the pairing loss itself relative to the formation of
clean and adversarial pairs. To our surprise, inducing sim-
ilarity between random pairs of logits led to high levels of
robustness on MNIST and SVHN. This leads us to suggest
clean logit pairing as a method worthy of study in its own
right rather than just as a baseline. CLP is surprisingly ef-
fective and has significantly lower computation cost than
adversarial training or ALP.
We note that our best results with CLP relied on adding
Gaussian noise to the input during training, a standard
neural network regularization technique (Sietsma & Dow,
1991).
4.2.3. CLEAN LOGIT SQUEEZING
Since clean logit pairing led to high accuracies, we hy-
pothesized that the model was learning to predict logits
of smaller magnitude and therefore being penalized for be-
coming overconfident. To this end, we tested penalizing the
norm of the logits, which we refer to as “logit squeezing”
for the rest of the paper. For MNIST, it turned out that logit
squeezing gave us better results than logit pairing.
5. Adversarial logit pairing results and
discussion
5.1. Results on MNIST
Here, we first present results with adversarial logit pairing
on MNIST. We found that the exact value of the logit pair-
ing weight did not matter too much on MNIST as long as it
was roughly between 0.2 and 1. As long as some logit pair-
ing was added, the accuracy on adversarial examples im-
proved compared to vanilla adversarial training. We used a
final logit pairing weight of 1 in the values reported in Table
1. A weight of 1 corresponds to weighting both the adver-
sarial logit pairing loss and the cross-entropy loss equally.
We used the LeNet model as in Madry et al. (2017). We
also used the same attack parameters they used: total adver-
sarial perturbation of 76.5/255 (0.3), perturbation per step
of 2.55/255 (0.01), and 40 total attack steps with 1 random
restart. Similar to Madry et al. (2017), we generated black
box examples for MNIST by independently initializing and
adversarially training a copy of the LeNet model. We then
used the PGD attack on this model to generate the black
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box examples.
Method White Box Black Box Clean
M-PGD 93.2% 96.0% 98.5%
ALP 96.4% 97.5% 98.8%
Table 1. Comparison of adversarial logit pairing and vanilla adver-
sarial training on MNIST. All accuracies reported are for the PGD
attack.
As shown in Table 1, adversarial logit pairing achieves state
of the art on MNIST for the PGD attack. It improves white
box accuracy from 93.2% to 96.4%, and it improves black
box accuracy from 96.0% to 97.5%.
5.2. Results on SVHN
Method White Box Black Box Clean
M-PGD 44.4% 55.4% 96.9%
ALP 46.9% 56.2% 96.2%
Table 2. Comparison of adversarial logit pairing and vanilla adver-
sarial training on SVHN. All accuracies reported are for the PGD
attack.
Our PGD attack parameters for SVHN were as follows: a
total epsilon perturbation of 12/255, a per-step epsilon of
3/255, and 10 attack iterations.
For SVHN, we used the RevNet-9 model (Gomez et al.,
2017). RevNets are similar to ResNets in that they both use
residual connections, have similar architectures, and get
similar accuracies on multiple datasets. However, RevNets
have large memory savings compared to ResNets, as their
memory usage is constant and does not scale with the num-
ber of layers. Because of this, we used RevNets in order
to take advantage of larger batch sizes and quicker conver-
gence times.
Similar to MNIST, most logit pairing values from 0.5 to
1 worked, and as long as some logit pairing was added, it
greatly improved accuracies. However, making the logit
pairing values too large (e.g. anything larger than 2) did not
lead to any benefit and was roughly the same as vanilla ad-
versarial training. The final adversarial logit pairing weight
used in Table 2 was 0.5.
5.3. Results on ImageNet
5.3.1. MOTIVATION
Prior to this work, the standard baseline of PGD adversarial
training had not yet been scaled to ImageNet. Kurakin et
al. (2017a) showed that adversarial training with one-step
attacks confers robustness to other one-step attacks, but is
unable to make a difference with multi-step attacks. Train-
ing on multi-step attacks did not help either. Madry et al.
(2017) demonstrated successful defenses based on multi-
step noisy PGD adversarial training on MNIST and CIFAR-
10, but did not scale the process to ImageNet.
Here, we implement and scale the state of the art adver-
sarial training method from CIFAR-10 and MNIST to Ima-
geNet for the first time. We then implement our adversarial
logit pairing method for comparison.
5.3.2. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
The cost of adversarial training scales with the number of
attack steps because a full round of backpropagation is per-
formed with each step. This means that a rough estimate of
the total adversarial training time of a model can be found
by multiplying the total clean training time by the num-
ber of attack steps. With ImageNet, this can be especially
costly without any optimizations.
To effectively scale up adversarial training with PGD to Im-
ageNet, we implemented synchronous distributed training
in Tensorflow with 53 workers: 50 were used for gradi-
ent aggregation, and 3 were left as backup replicas. Each
worker had one p100 card. We experimented with asyn-
chronous gradient updates, but we found that it led to stale
gradients and poor convergence. Additionally, we used 17
parameter servers that ran on CPUs. Large batch training
helped to scale up adversarial training as well: each replica
had a batch size of 32, for an effective batch size of 1600
images. We found that the total time to convergence was
approximately 6 days.
Similar to Kurakin et al. (2017a), we use the InceptionV3
model to implement adversarial training on ImageNet in
order to better compare results.
Like Szegedy et al. (2016), we used RMSProp for our op-
timizer, a starting learning rate of 0.045, a learning rate
decay every two epochs at an exponential rate of 0.94, and
momentum of 0.9.
Finally, we used the Cleverhans library (Nicolas Papernot,
2017) to implement our adversarial attacks.
5.3.3. TARGETED VS. UNTARGETED ATTACKS
Athalye et al. (2018) state that on ImageNet, accuracy on
targeted attacks is a much more meaningful metric to use
than accuracy on untargeted attacks. They state that this
is because untargeted attacks can cause misclassification of
very similar classes (e.g. images of two very similar dog
breeds), which is not meaningful. This is consistent with
observations by Kurakin et al. (2017a).
To that end, as Athalye et al. (2018) recommends, all accu-
racies we report on ImageNet are for targeted attacks, and
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all adversarial training was done with targeted attacks.
5.3.4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Results with adversarial logit pairing. We present our
main ImageNet results in Tables 3 and 4. All accuracies
reported refer to the worst case accuracies among all at-
tacks we tried in each of the two threat models we consider
(white box and black box). We used the following attacks
in our attack suite, which are all from Madry et al. (2017),
Kurakin et al. (2017a), and Trame`r et al. (2018): Step-LL,
Step-Rand, R+Step-LL, R+Step-Rand, Iter-Rand, Iter-LL,
PGD-Rand, and PGD-LL. The suffixes ”Rand” and ”LL”
denote targeting a random class and targeting the least
likely class, respectively. For the multi-step attacks in our
suite, we varied the size of the total adversarial perturba-
tion, the size of the perturbation per step, and the number
of attack steps. Below are the maximum values of each of
these sizes that we tried:
• Size of total adversarial perturbation: 16/255 on a
scale of 0 to 1
• Size of total adversarial perturbation per step: 2/255
on a scale of 0 to 1
• Number of attack steps: 10
All accuracies reported are on the ImageNet validation set.
White Box White Box
Method Top 1 Top 5
Regular training 0.7% 4.4 %
Trame`r et al. (2018) 1.3% 6.5 %
Kurakin et al. (2017a) 1.5% 5.5 %
M-PGD 3.9% 10.3%
ALP 27.9% 55.4%
Table 3. Comparison of adversarial logit pairing and vanilla adver-
sarial training on ImageNet. All accuracies reported are for white
box accuracy on the ImageNet validation set.
Black Box Black Box
Method Top 1 Top 5
M-PGD 36.5% 62.3%
ALP 46.7% 74.0%
Trame`r et al. (2018) 47.1% 74.3%
Table 4. Comparison of adversarial logit pairing and vanilla adver-
sarial training on ImageNet. All accuracies reported are for black
box accuracy on the ImageNet validation set.
Damaging Ensemble Adversarial Training. Ensemble
adversarial training (Trame`r et al., 2018) reported the state
of the art for ImageNet black box attacks at 66.6% Top-
1 black box accuracy for InceptionV3. Here, we present
a black box attack that significantly damages the defense
proposed in Ensemble Adversarial Training.
We construct a black box attack by taking an ALP-trained
ImageNet model and constructing a transfer attack with
that model. Out of all of the attacks we tried, we found
that the Iter-Rand attack (Kurakin et al., 2017a) was the
strongest against Ensemble Adversarial Training. This at-
tack reduces the accuracy of Ensemble Adversarial Train-
ing from 66.6% Top-1 black box accuracy to 47.1%.
We hypothesize that the reason this attack was so strong is
because it came from a model that had used multi-step ad-
versarial training. The attacks used in Trame`r et al. (2018)
all came from models that had been trained with one or
two steps of adversarial training. Black box results from
Madry et al. (2017) generally show that examples from ad-
versarially trained models are more likely to transfer to
other models.
Thus, we recommend adversarial training with full iterative
attacks to provide a minimal level of white box and black
box robustness on ImageNet. When testing black box ac-
curacy on ImageNet, we recommend using attacks from
models that have been adversarially trained with multiple
steps to get a sense of the strongest possible black box at-
tack. Adversarial training with one step attacks (even with
ensemble training) on ImageNet can be broken in both the
white box and black box case.
Discussion. Firstly, our results show that PGD adversarial
training can lead to convergence on ImageNet when com-
bined with synchronous gradient updates and large batch
sizes. Scaling adversarial training to ImageNet had not
been previously shown before and had been an open ques-
tion (Athalye et al., 2018). Multi-step adversarial training
does show an improvement on white box accuracies from
the previous state-of-the-art, from 1.5% to 3.9%.
Secondly, we see that ALP further improves white box ac-
curacy from the adversarial training baseline – showing an
improvement from 3.9% to 27.9%. Adversarial logit pair-
ing also improves black box accuracy from the M-PGD
baseline, going from 36.5% to 47.1%.
Finally, these results show that adversarial logit pairing
achieves state of the art on ImageNet on white box attacks
– with a drastic 20x improvement over the previous state of
the art (Kurakin et al., 2017a; Trame`r et al., 2018). We do
this while still matching the black box results of Ensemble
Adversarial Training, the current state-of-the-art black box
defense (Trame`r et al., 2018).
We hypothesize that adversarial logit pairing works well
because it provides an additional prior that regularizes the
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model toward a more accurate understanding of the classes.
If we train the model with only the cross-entropy loss, it
is prone to learning spurious functions that fit the training
distribution but have undefined behavior off the training
manifold. Adversarial training adds additional information
about the structure of the space. By adding an assump-
tion that small perturbations should not change the class,
regardless of direction, adversarial training introduces an-
other prior that forces the model to select functions that
have sensible behavior over a much larger region. How-
ever, adversarial training does not include any information
about the relationship between a clean adversarial example
and the adversarial version of the same example. In adver-
sarial training, we might take an image of a cat, perturb
it so the model thinks it is a dog, and then ask the model
to still recognize the image as a cat. There is no signal to
tell the model that the adversarial example is similar specif-
ically to the individual cat image that started the process.
Adversarial logit pairing forces the explanations of a clean
example and the corresponding adversarial example to be
similar. This is essentially a prior encouraging the model
to learn logits that are a function of the truly meaningful
features in the image (position of cat ears, etc.) and ignore
the features that are spurious (off-manifold directions intro-
duced by adversarial perturbations). We can also think of
the process as distilling (Hinton et al., 2015) the knowledge
from the clean domain into the adversarial domain and vice
versa.
Similar to the dip in clean accuracy on CIFAR-10 reported
by Madry et al. (2017), we found that our models have a
slight dip in clean accuracy to 72%. However, we believe
this is outweighed by the large gains in adversarial accura-
cies.
5.3.5. COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT ARCHITECTURES
Model architecture plays a role in adversarial robustness
(Cubuk et al., 2017), and models with higher capacities
tend to be more robust (Kurakin et al., 2017a; Madry et al.,
2017). Since ImageNet is a particularly challenging dataset,
we think that studying different model architectures in con-
junction with adversarial training would be valuable. In
this work, we primarily studied InceptionV3 to offer bet-
ter comparisons to previous literature. With the rest of our
available computational resources, we were able to study
an additional model (ResNet-101) to see if residual con-
nections impacted adversarial robustness. We used ALP to
train the models, and results are reported in Tables 5 and 6.
5.4. Clean logit pairing results
We experimented with clean logit pairing on MNIST, and
we found that it gave surprisingly high results on white
box and black box accuracies. As mentioned in our meth-
Method White Box Top 1 White Box Top 5
InceptionV3 27.9% 55.4%
ResNet-101 30.2% 55.8%
Table 5. Comparison of InceptionV3 and ResNet101 on Ima-
geNet. All accuracies reported are for white box accuracy on
the ImageNet validation set.
Method Black Box Top 1 Black Box Top 5
InceptionV3 46.7% 74.0%
ResNet-101 36.0% 62.2%
Table 6. Comparison of InceptionV3 and ResNet101 on Ima-
geNet. All accuracies reported are for black box accuracy on
the ImageNet validation set.
ods section, we augmented images with Gaussian noise
first and then applied clean logit pairing or logit squeezing.
Logit squeezing resulted in slightly higher PGD accuracies
than CLP (detailed in Figure 1). Table 7 contains our fi-
nal MNIST results on clean logit squeezing. For evaluation
with PGD, we used the same attack parameters as our eval-
uation for adversarial logit pairing.
Method White box Black box Clean
M-PGD 93.2% 96.0% 98.8%
Logit squeezing 86.4% 96.8% 99.0%
Table 7. Comparison of clean logit squeezing and vanilla adver-
sarial training on MNIST. All accuracies reported are for the PGD
attack.
As Table 7 shows, clean logit squeezing is competitive with
adversarial training, despite the large reduction in computa-
tional cost.
We also experimented with changing the weight of logit
pairing and logit squeezing to see if it acts as a controllable
parameter, and results are in Figure 1.
One thing to note about Figure 1 is that simply augmenting
images with Gaussian noise is enough to bring up PGD ac-
curacy to around 25 % – about 2.5 times better than guess-
ing at random. We would like to emphasize that the noise
was added during training time, not test time. Noise and
other randomized test time defenses have been shown to be
broken by Athalye et al. (2018). Going from nearly 0 per-
cent PGD accuracy to 25 percent with just Gaussian noise
suggests that there could be other simple changes to train-
ing procedures that result in better robustness against at-
tacks.
The below table reports results on SVHN with the PGD
attack. Below are the attack parameters used:
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Figure 1. Varying the logit pairing weight for MNIST
• Size of total adversarial perturbation: 12/255 on a
scale of 0 to 1
• Size of total adversarial perturbation per step: 3/255
on a scale of 0 to 1
• Number of attack steps: 10
Method White Box Black Box Clean
M-PGD 44.4% 55.4% 96.9%
CLP 39.1% 55.8% 95.5%
Table 8. Clean logit pairing results on SVHN.
As the above tables show, clean logit pairing is competitive
with adversarial training for black box results, despite the
large reduction in computational cost. Adversarial training
with multi-step attacks scales with the number of steps per
attack because full backpropagation is completed with each
attack step. In other words, if the normal training time of a
model is N, adversarial training with k steps per attack will
roughly cause the full training time of the model to be kN.
In contrast, the cost of CLP in terms of floating point oper-
ations and memory consumption is O(1) in the sense that
it does not scale with the number or size of hidden layers
in the model, input image size, or number of attack steps.
It does scale with the number of logits, but this is negligi-
ble compared to the other factors. Typically the number
of logits is determined by the task (10 for CIFAR-10, 100
for ImageNet) and remains fixed, while other factors like
model size are desirable to increase. For example, binary
classification is a common task in many real world applica-
tions like spam and fraud detection.
We hope that CLP points the way to further effective de-
fenses that are essentially free. Defenses with low computa-
tional cost are more likely to be adopted since they require
fewer resources. The future of machine learning security
is much brighter if security can be accomplished without a
major tradeoff against training efficiency.
6. Comparison to other possible approaches
Logit pairing is similar to two other approaches that have
been previously shown to improve adversarial robustness:
label smoothing andmixup.
Label smoothing (Szegedy et al., 2016) consists of train-
ing a classifier using soft targets for the cross-entropy loss
rather than hard targets. The correct class is given a tar-
get probability of 1 − δ and the remaining δ probability
mass is divided uniformly between the incorrect classes.
This technique is somewhat related to our work because
smaller logits will generally cause smoother output distri-
butions, but note that label smoothing would be satisfied
to have very large logits so long as the probabilities af-
ter normalization are smooth. Warde-Farley & Goodfellow
(2016) showed that label smoothing offers a small amount
of robustness to adversarial examples, and it is included by
default in the CleverHans tutorial on adversarial examples
(Nicolas Papernot, 2017).
Mixup (Zhang et al., 2017) trains the model on input points
that are interpolated between training examples. At these
interpolated input points, the output target is formed by sim-
ilarly interpolating between the target distributions for each
of the training examples. Zhang et al. (2017) reports that
mixup increases robustness to adversarial examples.
We present our results comparing adversarial logit pair-
ing to label smoothing and mixup in Table 9. Here, we
use ResNet-101 on ImageNet, and all evaluations are with
PGD.We find that adversarial logit pairing provides a much
stronger defense than either of these two approaches.
Method Top 1 Top 5
Mixup 0.1% 1.5%
Label smoothing 1.6% 10.0%
ALP 30.2% 55.8%
Table 9.White box accuracies under Madry et al. (2017) attack on
ImageNet for label smoothing, mixup, and adversarial logit pair-
ing.
Besides these related methods of defense against ad-
versarial examples, ALP is also similar to a method
of semi-supervised learning: virtual adversarial training
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(Miyato et al., 2017). Virtual adversarial training (VAT) is
a method designed to learn from unlabeled data by training
the model to resist adversarial perturbations of unlabeled
data. The goal of VAT is to reduce test error when training
with a small set of labeled examples, not to cause robust-
ness to adversarial examples. VAT consists of:
1. Construct adversarial examples by perturbing unla-
beled examples
2. Specifically, make the adversarial examples by maxi-
mizing the KL divergence between the predictions on
the clean examples and the predictions on the adver-
sarial examples.
3. During model training, add a loss term that minimizes
KL divergence between predictions on clean and ad-
versarial examples.
ALP does not include (1) or (2) but does resemble (3). Both
ALP and VAT encourage the full distribution of predictions
on clean and adversarial examples to be similar. VAT does
so using a non-symmetric loss applied to the output prob-
abilities; ALP does so using a symmetric loss applied to
the logits. During the design of our defense, we found
that VAT offered an improvement over the baseline Madry
model on MNIST, but ALP consistently performed better
than VAT on MNIST across several hyperparameter values.
ALP also performed better than VAT with the direction of
the KL flipped. We therefore focused on further developing
ALP. The better performance of ALP than VATmay be due
to the fact that the KL divergence can suffer from saturat-
ing gradients or it may be due to the fact that the KL diver-
gence is invariant to a shift of all the logits for an individual
example while the logit pairing loss is not. Logit pairing en-
courages the logits for the clean and adversarial example to
be centered on the same mean logit value, which doesn’t
change the information in the output probabilities but may
affect the learning dynamics.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
In conclusion, we implement adversarial training at un-
precendented scale and present logit pairing as a defense.
The experiments in this paper were run on NVIDIA p100s,
but with the recent availability of much more powerful
hardware (NVIDIA v100s, Cloud TPUs, etc.), we believe
that defenses for adversarial examples on ImageNet will
become even more scalable. Specifically our contributions
are:
• We answer the open question as to whether adversarial
training scales to ImageNet.
• We introduce adversarial logit pairing (ALP), an ex-
tension to adversarial training that greatly increases
its effectiveness.
• We introduce clean logit pairing and logit squeezing,
low-cost alternatives to adversarial training that can
increase the adoption of robust machine learning due
to their requirement of very few resources.
• We demonstrate that ALP-trained models can gener-
ate attacks strong enough to significantly damage the
previously state of the art Ensemble Adversarial Train-
ing defense, which was used by all 10 of the top de-
fense teams in the NIPS 2017 competition on adver-
sarial examples.
• We show that adversarial logit pairing achieves the
state of the art defense for white box and black box
attacks on ImageNet.
Our results suggest that feature pairing (matching adversar-
ial and clean intermediate features instead of logits) may
also prove useful in the future.
One limitation to our defenses is that they are not currently
certified or verified (there is no proof that the true robust-
ness of the system is similar to the robustness that we mea-
sured empirically). Research into certification and veri-
fication methods (Aditi Raghunathan, 2018; Aman Sinha,
2018; Katz et al., 2017; Kolter & Wong, 2017) could make
it possible to certify or verify these same networks in future
work. Current certification methods do not scale to the size
of models we trained here or are only able to provide tight
certification bounds for models that were trained to be easy
to certify using a specific certification method.
We would like to note that these defense mechanisms are
not yet sufficient to secure machine learning in a real sys-
tem (see many of the concerns raised by (Brown et al.,
2017) and Gilmer et al. (2018)), and that attacks could be
developed against our work in the future. Here, we use
ALP in conjunction with the PGD attack since it is the
strongest attack presented so far, but since ALP is indepen-
dent of the actual attack it is used with, it is conceivable
that ALP could be used in conjunction with future attacks
to develop stronger defenses. In conclusion, we present
our defense as the current state of the art of research into
defenses, and we believe it will serve as one step along the
path to a complete defense in the future.
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